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ABSTRACT. The South China Sea (SCS) is becoming an increasingly contentious
source of geopolitical tension due to its significance as an international trade route,
possessor of potentially significant oil and natural gas resources, China’s increasing
diplomatic and military assertiveness, and the U.S.’ recent and ongoing Pacific Pivot
strategy. Countries as varied as China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and other
adjacent countries have claims on this region’s islands and natural resources. China
has been particularly assertive in asserting its SCS claims by creating a nine-dash
line map claiming to give it de facto maritime control over this entire region without
regard to international law on claimed land features and without providing transparency for the rationale behind its assertions. Regional countries are responding by
increasing defense spending and developing responses to Chinese assertiveness such
as the 2014 Australia-Japan defense technology sharing agreement. This presentation
will examine the reactions to Beijing’s assertiveness by other Asian-Pacific countries including Australia, Japan, other Southeast Asian countries, and the U.S. It
incorporates research and analysis from scholarly literature and multiple national
and international government organizations. This work concludes by advocating that
the U.S. and its allies take more assertive positions to counteract Beijing’s claims to
this region.
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Introduction
The beginning of Fall 2015 sees international attention justifiably focused on
the military confrontation between the U.S. and various allies and the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria and spillover refugee migration from this conflict into
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the European Union. International geopolitical attention during this year has
also been focused on Russian annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s aggressiveness toward Ukraine, and ongoing areas of crisis involving Afghanistan,
Iran, and Pakistan. While all of these international security crisis centers are
important, geopolitical observers must also recognize the SCS’ increasing
strategic importance and source of international tension during the second
decade of this millennium.
This body of water encompasses nations as diverse as China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia and affects the trading and strategic
interests of many world countries including the Australia, India, Japan, and
the United States. It is a semi-enclosed area bordered on the west by Vietnam,
on the east by Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines, on the south by
Indonesia and Malaysia, and on the north by China and Taiwan covering an
area approximately 550–650 nautical miles wide and a length of over 1,200
nautical miles. China’s growing diplomatic, economic, and military power
have increased Beijing’s assertiveness toward the SCS and culminated in it
issuing the following nine-dashed map to highlight its territorial, island,
seabed, and waterborne claims to this region with an another map reflecting
the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the SCS claimed by adjacent
countries. Concern over increasing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS and the
issuance of this map is reflected in multiple sources.1

Courtesy: STRATFOR
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Source: UNCLOS and CIA

Researching this region’s geopolitical influence and significance is important
for Chinese scholars as reflected in an increase in the number of published
journal articles on the nine-dashed map between January 2000–December
2012 from 21 between 2000–2002 to 189 between 2010–2012 according to a
search of the database China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). 2
Such research must also be of global provenance and significance due to the
estimated 40% of international trade passing through SCS waters, the increasing levels of defense spending by adjoining countries, SCS’ potential
fossil fuel energy resources, and ongoing Chinese efforts to build floating
islands in the SCS and land reclamation efforts including constructing a new
runway on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Archipelago, creating land masses
in the Spratly’s Subu Reef, and developing a helipad and air defense site on
Gavin Reef to bolster its geopolitical claims and deter the interests of geographically adjoining claimant powers and the geopolitical interests of powers
as far away as the United States. This behavior by Beijing is contrary to the
2002 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which China has signed and urges
ASEAN countries to respect freedom of navigation and regional overflight
in this area while also exercising self-restraint in conducting activities which
could escalate disputes or affect regional stability such as occupying uninhabited islands or other features including reefs, shoals, and cays. Chinese
behavior and policies in the SCS also need to be critical parts of foreign and
national security policy discussion during the 2016 U.S. presidential election
campaign.3
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Fiery Cross Reef-Courtesy: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative–
Center for Strategic and International Studies

These claims, according to Beijing, reflect and are justified by the experience
of historic surveying expeditions, fishing, and naval activities dating back to
the 15th century. Claims to this area are also reflected in a 1947 map drawn
by the defunct Kuomintang government and reaffirmed in official maps published by the People’s Republic of China from 1949-present. China’s lofty
sense of its historical maritime influence was demonstrated in an October 24,
2003 address to the Australian Parliament, when Chinese President Hu
Jintao claimed that Chinese mariner Zheng He’s exploration fleet had sailed
as far south as Australia in the 1420s. A 2013 map issued by China’s State
Bureau of Surveying and Mapping adds a tenth dash placed east of Taiwan
incorporating that nation into China within 70 miles of Yonaguni which is
Japan’s westernmost island in the Ryukyu Island chain. This map is also
featured as a background in new Chinese passports drawing protests from
the Philippines and Vietnam.4
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Ten-dash map including Taiwan as part of China.
Courtesy: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

In May 2009 Beijing’s submitted a claim to the United Nations Commission
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international organization striving to
establish a legal framework governing all uses of oceans, using the ninedashed map claiming indisputable sovereignty over the entire body of water,
islands, seabed, and subsoil within the 200 mile nautical limits of the Outer
Continental Shelf.5 This action produced acute concern among other neighboring states with Malaysia and Vietnam filing a joint submission to UNCLOS
this same month contending that there are unresolved disputes in the territorial area defined by the Chinese submission, that Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi
and have worked to get the cooperation of other adjacent coastal states, that
this claim adheres to UNCLOS Article 76 covering continental shelf claims,
and that these two countries may make further supporting claims on this
topic to UNCLOS.6
Natural Resources and Trade Routes
The SCS is a major international trade route, adjoining nations are large
energy resource consumers, and it is also the site of potentially monumental
energy resources. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) notes
that non-OECD liquid fuel consumption in Asian countries is expected to
grow annually by 2.6% from 20% of global consumption in 2008 to over
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30% of global consumption by 2035. EIA also projects non-OECD Asian
natural gas consumption to grow 3.9% annually from 10% of global natural
gas consumption in 2008 to 19% by 2035 with China projected to account
for 43% of this growth. 7
EIA also estimates that the SCS contains nearly 11 billion barrels of oil
and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. In
addition, the U.S. Geological Survey has done additional analysis of potential
undiscovered conventional oil and gas fields in several Southeast Asia geologic provinces in 2010 as part of its World Petroleum Resources Assessment
Project. This study concluded that there could be between 5 and 22 billion
barrels of undiscovered oil and 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered
natural gas in these regions though the cost of extracting these resources
would be high.8
Over half of annual global merchant fleet tonnage passes through the
Lombok, Malacca, and Sunda Straits continuing to the SCS including nearly
1/3 of global crude oil and over ½ of global liquefied natural gas (LNG)
trade passing through the SCS. Asia’s growing energy demand leads EIA to
expect increased oil flow from producers in the Persian Gulf and Africa to
pass through the SC S with the Malacca Strait being the shortest sea route
between these suppliers and Asian markets. This also applies to LNG trade
with SCS countries importing from supplier countries as varied as Australia,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Qatar accounting for nearly 75% of LNG exports
to this region.9
China’s Claims
China insists its historic claims cover four major archipelagic groups in the
SCS-Spratlys (Nanha), Paracels (Xisha), Pratas (Dongsha), and Macclesfield
Bank (Zongsha) along with Scarborough Reef (Huangyan Island). There is
considerable debate over whether China has claimed these areas since ancient
times, whether Beijing claims sovereignty over geographic features such as
islands, reefs, and shoals failing to meet UNCLOS definition of an island
under international law, and the validity of Beijing’s claims. Chinese strategists also incorporate a first and second island chain on Western Pacific
territories into their geopolitical aspirations. The first chain includes Indonesia,
the Korean Peninsula, Kurile Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The
second island chain includes the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern
Mariana Islands.10

151

China Island Chains Map Courtesy: U.S. Department of Defense.

International legal scholars have expressed concerns with the scope of China’s
claims including mentioning that naming an area the SCS does not establish
sovereignty over it, ambiguity over the precise meaning of China’s ninedashed map, and asserting that cartographic dashes do not suggest maritime
boundary claims and have no impact on resolving maritime boundary disputes. Additional problems include cartographic materials losing credibility
when they contradict each other, that ambiguous and incoherent cartography
weakens the evidentiary strength of a claim in international law, ambiguity
in defining historical waters, and that such maps need to be drawn up by
neutral experts instead of partisan countries to enhance their probative value
in international law.11
Other Nations Claims
This situation is complicated further by other nations’ claims to SCS waters,
islands, reefs, and continental shelf. The Philippines passed a law in 2009
saying that Scarborough Shoal and other islands Manila claims in the SCS
(Kalayaan Island Group) will be governed under UNCLOS Article 121. The
Philippines also notified UNCLOS’ Commission on the Limitations of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) it intends to submit limitations on its continental
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shelf in the SCS and that it will also claim an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) claim from its main archipelago’s archipelagic baselines and will also
claim an extended continental shelf into the SCS beyond its EEZ’s outer
limits.12
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines informed the Chinese Embassy in
Manila that they had submitted an application with UNCLOS to arbitrate
their competing claims. This was rejected by the Chinese Ambassador to the
Philippines on February 19 and Beijing’s refusal to arbitrate this dispute has
strained bilateral relations between these countries and produced greater
obstacles to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China
reaching a binding SCS Code of Conduct.13
Taiwan takes a similar position to China claiming an EEZ of 200 nautical
miles. In May 2012, Taiwanese National Security Director General Tsai DerSheng announced that Vietnam and the Philippines have asked Taiwan not to
work with China on South Sea issues. While Taipei generally favors peaceful
solutions to territorial disputes, some Taiwanese scholars and government
officials advocate more assertive actions. In April 2012 members of the parliamentary Foreign and National Defense Committee visited Taiping island
where they were briefed by Taiwanese troops on their defense capabilities
and these islands have been reinforced by military personnel to augment to
Taipei’s sovereignty claims. 14
Malaysia has taken a nonconfrontational stance with China on this issue.
It has strong economic relationships with Beijing who became Kuala Lumpur’s largest trading partner in 2010, Malaysia does not have the military
capacity to contest China’s claims, it does not have nationalist pressure to act
against China, and its politicians and public opinion are more concerned with
maritime disagreements with Indonesia.15
Vietnam, in contrast, takes a more assertive approach on SCS matters
seeking to cooperate with the Philippines and Malaysia while also striving
for balance with Beijing to keep bilateral relations from being excessively
strained. Both Hanoi and Manila are heavily dependent on fishing though
their economics are increasingly tied to China. China and Vietnam reached a
Gulf of Tonkin delimitation agreement in 2000, but fought over disputed
islands such as the Paracels in 1974 and 1988 with China occupying these
islands and leading the Vietnamese to believe China is willing to use force to
settle territorial disputes. Hanoi also faces domestic nationalist pressure to
stand up to Beijing due to the centuries’ long historical enmity between these
two countries despite both being governed by Communist Parties. Vietnam’s
economy depends significantly on access to adjacent energy and fishing resources and China’s nine-dashed map cutting through Vietnam’s EEZ renews
fears in Vietnam and other claimant nations that China aspires to claim both
island features and all waters within the nine-dashed map.16
153

Recent years have seen numerous security incidents between China and
these countries. In June 2012, Vietnam passed a maritime law declaring its
jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and requiring all foreign naval
ships to notify Vietnamese authorities before entering these areas. China expressed its opposition to this statute by establishing a prefecture level administrative city Sansha on the Paracel’s Woody Island which would be overseen
by the central government. In addition, the state-owned Chinese National
Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) contested Vietnamese energy claims by inviting foreign oil companies to jointly exploit nine drilling blocks in disputed
areas two days after the Vietnamese law’s passage. Beijing’s pressuring of
foreign oil companies drilling in South China Sea followed upon China telling U.S. and other foreign oil firms during Summer 2007 to stop collaborating
with Vietnamese oil drillers or face unspecified consequences in their business
dealings with China.17

Maritime and Territorial Disputes Involving China including Paracel Islands,
Scarborough Shoal, and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
Courtesy: Congressional Research Service and ESRI.
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The Philippines and China have periodically had security incidents in these
waters. Beijing has accused the Philippines of occupying Chinese islands and
on January 27, 2014 a Chinese coast guard vessel used a water cannon to try
to drive away Philippine fisherman from Scarborough Shoal with Chinese
diplomatic personnel in Manila being summoned to the Foreign Ministry to
hear the government’s strongly worded protest. The Philippine Foreign
Ministry said nine such harassment incidents occurred during the previous
year and in February 2014 the U.S. Navy Commander said the U.S. would
help the Philippines if conflict resulted over these disputed waters.18
Chinese Incidents with U.S. Military in SCS and Elsewhere
Chinese assertiveness of its maritime and territorial claims in the SCS has not
been limited to adjacent countries. It has also targeted normal U.S. military
and intelligence gathering activities in this region over the past decade. On
March 31, 2001 a U.S. EP-3 electronic naval surveillance plane was struck
by a Chinese fighter pilot and forced to make an emergency landing at China’s
Hainan Island. The Chinese pilot was killed and the U.S. crew was detained
for a eleven days before being released although China was able to gain
some sensitive information about this plane’s technological capabilities. 19
Hainan Island has become a militarily and strategically significant location
for China featuring a naval base hosting its first aircraft carrier, some of its
submarine fleet, and the Wenchang Space Launch facility as part of China’s
space program infrastructure.20
Additional Chinese targeting of U.S. military ocean surveillance ships
occurred with the USNS Bowditch (2001 and 2002), Bruce C. Heezen (2003),
Victorious (2003–2004), Effective (2004), John McDonnell (2005); Mary
Sears (2005); Loyal (2005), and Impeccable (2009). On March 5, 2009, the
Impeccable was surrounded by five Chinese naval vessels approximately 75
miles southeast of Hainan Island who attempted to snag the Impeccable’s
towing cable. The U.S. Navy responded by dispatching warships to escort
subsequent unarmed survey and ocean surveillance vessels.21
New tensions occurred beginning November 23, 2013 when China
established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea
raising concern an ADIZ could be established over the SCS. With this edict,
Beijing set rules requiring aircraft flying in this area to:
• Report a flight plan to the Chinese government;
• Maintain radio communication and respond to Chinese government identification inquiries;
• Maintain radar transponder function; and
• Exhibit clear nationality and logo markings.
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This announcement went on to specify that China’s military would take
emergency defensive measures to respond to aircraft not giving required
identification.22

Hainan Island Airbases and regional location. Courtesy: Air Power Australia

On December 5, 2013, the missile cruiser USS Cowpens was conducting surveillance of China’s Liaoning carrier battle group about 32 miles southeast
of Hainan Island. Two Chinese naval vessels approached the Cowpens with
one of them altering course and crossing directly in front of the Cowpens bow
forcing it to come to a complete stop to avoid a collision while the Chinese
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ship passed less than 100 yards in front. This behavior by China violates professional maritime behavior such as the Convention of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea in which China participates.23
Further Chinese aggressiveness toward U.S. military assets occurred on
August 19, 2014 when an armed Chinese jet fighter conducted a dangerous
intercept of a Navy P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft in international airspace 135
miles east of Hainan Island. Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John
Kirby told reporters that the Chinese jet made several passes of the Poseidon
crossing under the aircraft within 50–100 feet. Kirby went on to mention the
U.S. had expressed its strong concern about this unsafe and unprofessional
behavior to the Chinese.24
On September 25, 2014, U.S. Pacific Command Commander Admiral
Samuel Locklear, when asked about increasing Chinese aircraft intercepts in
that region, acknowledged increasing Chinese aerial and naval activity in that
region, said the U.S. and China regularly interact about preventing misunderstandings or bad interactions such as the August 19 incident, and expressed
his hope that the U.S. and China would respect each other’s international
maritime and airspace rights.25
Regional Defense Spending Increases
This increasing tension occurs within a strategic context of increased defense
spending in recent years by nations adjacent to the SCS and whose economic
and strategic interests are directly affected by developments in its waters. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database reports East Asian nations military spending increased from
$139 billion in 1998 to $329 billion in 2014. Per capita defense spending
figures from these counties between 1998 and 2014 also demonstrates significant increases:
Australia 1998 $380
Brunei 1998 $927
China 1998 $14.60
Indonesia 1998 $3
Japan 1998 $290
Malaysia 1998 $51.80
Philippines 1998 $16.50
South Korea 1998 $226
Taiwan 1998 $421
Vietnam 2003 $10.50

2014 $1,077
2014 $1,300
2014 $155
2014 $27.80
2014 $360
2014 $163
2014 $32.90
2014 $741
2014 $437
2013 $4626

The significant economic growth of many of these countries has enabled
most of them to achieve these increased defense expenditures without having
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this spending account for additional percentages in their annual government
spending as the following figures demonstrate:
Australia 1998 5.7%
Brunei 1998 12.1%
China 1998 11.9%
Indonesia 1998 3.8%
Japan 1998 2.7%
Malaysia 1998 6.4%
Philippines 1998 8.1%
South Korea 1998 6.4%
Taiwan 1998 11.6%
Vietnam 2003 7.6%

2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014

4.8%
9.3%
7.3%
4.1%
2.5%
5.4%
6.0%
12.1%
10.6%
8.3%27

Increasing tensions in the SCS region are likely to drive further defense
spending increases by adjacent countries with Chinese defense spending and
increasing regional assertiveness and the U.S.’ pivot to the Asia-Pacific likely
to play critical roles in ensuring the SCS region’s vulnerability to regional or
international conflict. Such conflict is likely to involve or affect powers from
outside the SCS such as the Australia, Japan, and the U.S. and impact the
interests of powers as far away as India and Europe.28
U.S. and Allied Responses
The U.S. has not taken a formal position on SCS territorial claims. At the
July 23, 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton reaffirmed traditional U.S. support for freedom of navigation
and respect for international law, and opposed claimants using force. She went
on to stress that maritime claims should be derived solely from legitimate
claims to land features. Additional characteristics of U.S. SCS policy include
peacefully resolving territorial disputes without threats of coercion or intimidation, parties avoiding taking provocative or unilateral actions which might
disrupt the status quo and jeopardize and security, opposing claims impinging on lawful rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea belonging to lawful
nations, that that coastal states do not have the right under UNCLOS to
regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ’s. 29 The U.S. also issues
annual reports on attempts by various nations to interfere with international
freedom of navigation with the Fiscal Year 2014 report charging China with
making excessive maritime claims including: excessive straight baselines;
security jurisdiction in contiguous zones; airspace jurisdiction over EEZ;
domestic law criminalizing foreign entity survey activity in EEZ; and requiring prior permission of innocent passage of foreign military ships through
territorial seas.30
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A more tangible rhetorical, though economically and militarily unresolved,
demonstration of U.S. commitment to resisting Chinese territorial claims in
the nine-dash map is Washington’s strategic Asia-Pacific pivot originating in
2010–2011. Based on the questionable rationale that the need for a U.S.
military presence in the Mideast is declining and that this makes it necessary
for the U.S. to shift its military assets and emphasis to East Asia including
nations adjoining the SCS was articulated on a January 5, 2012 Defense
Department document. This assessment stressed that U.S. economic and security interests are closely linked to developments in an area encompassing
the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South
Asia. It went on to stress that the U.S. would expand existing relationships
with Asian allies and key partners to enhance collective capacity for securing
common interests.31
A key policy declaration from this document announced the following
emphasis to maintain mutually cooperative dialogue with China while also
defending its interests and those of its Asia-Pacific allies:
The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce,
and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on
an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over
the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have
the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a
variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace
and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative
bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’s military power
must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions
in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States
will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we
maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping
with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working
closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to
promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying
stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic
dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.32

The U.S. has taken some steps to demonstrate this pivot as evidenced by a
November 2011 agreement between President Obama and then Australian
Prime Minister Julia Gillard deploying a few hundred Marines as a rotational
force to Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory.33 It is also increasing its
already significant military presence on Guam by transferring 8,000 Marines
from the Japanese island of Okinawa which is expected to occur by 2014.
This increased presence on Guam will also include Army construction of a
missile defense system, the addition of Air Force drones and B-52 bombers,
and the Navy expanded Guam’s port to accommodate visiting aircraft carriers,
and providing Vietnam $32 million to strengthen its maritime security.34
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The U.S. also seeks to develop Air-Sea Battle (ASB) doctrine to leverage
U.S. and allied air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space assets to reduce the risk
these forces face from growing Chinese anti-access air denial (A2AD)
capabilities seeking to prevent the U.S. and its allies from defending their
Asia/Pacific strategic interests through longer range precision weapons targeting airbases, capital ships, land forces, network infrastructure, and spacebased platforms. This involves developing networked integrated forces to
attack-in-depth and disrupt, defeat, and destroy hostile forces. Budgetary
funding for this initiative, which has become the Joint Concept for Access
and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), remains uncertain.35

Courtesy: Australian Department of Defence
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Courtesy: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Australia-Japan Defense Cooperation Agreement
and Additional Regional Security Concerns
Other nations in the region who are concerned by the Obama Administration’s
strategic inconstancy and U.S. defense spending constraints are exploring their
own options for enhancing cooperation against what they see as China’s
hegemonic aspirations. An example of this is a 2014 Australian-Japanese
Defense Cooperation Agreement. Signed on July 8, 2014 by Australian Prime
Minister Tony Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, this agreement commits these countries to share relevant defense equipment and technology to implement joint research, development, and production projects
for enhancing security and defense cooperation consistent with the United
Nations Charter.36
Australia is also acutely concerned with maintaining freedom of the seas
due to its proximity to the SCS and other strategic waterways such as the
Indian and Pacific Ocean.37 In its consultation document for a proposed 2015
Defense White Paper Australia’s Department of Defense included maritime
sovereignty disputes in North Asia and the SCS as areas of emerging security
concerns which might require direct Australian involvement.38
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Singaporean analyses of this issue stress the need for all parties to continue dialogue, strive for maximum collaboration between interested states,
stress the limited possibility of short or medium-term conflict, but remain
concern about the possibility for miscalculations and limited confrontations,
and prefer placing less emphasis on sovereignty issues and more on joint
resource exploration and development.39
India considers the Straits of Malacca leading from the SCS to the Indian
Ocean as a primary area of strategic concern and the SCS itself as a
secondary concern in its official Maritime Strategy document. 40 The 2014
edition of the East Asian Strategic Review published by Japan’s National
Institute of Defence Studies notes that tension continues between ASEAN
nations and China over territorial and maritime rights in the SCS. It noted
ASEAN and made partial progress to develop a “code of conduct” with
Beijing on this topic. In addition, this assessment also recognized strengthening Philippine-U.S. military cooperation such as the April 2013 Balikatan
(Shoulder-to-Shoulder) military exercise involving Japan and other countries
and also noted that the U.S. tilt/rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific would see
Washington reinforce its military presence in the Philippines by increasing
its number of naval vessel calls at Subic Bay and by increasing its military
assistance to Manila nearly 70% from 2013–2014.41
Conclusion
China’s nine-dashed map is an example of an aspiring hegemon seeking to
assert its muscle by coercively influencing its neighbors to submit to its
strategic objectives. An example of Beijing’s rhetorical assertiveness was
reflected in July 2013 when Chinese President Xi Jinping asserted: “we need
to do more to take interest in the sea, understand the sea, and strategically
manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power.”42 It is not surprising that it makes such audacious
and unrealistic geopolitical claims at a time when the Obama Administration
is seen as being unwilling to forcibly defend U.S. geopolitical interests in this
part of the world by its inaction and hesitancy in other global crisis areas.43
It would be desirable if the U.S. and other powers affected by SCS
developments would peacefully work to peacefully resolve their disputes in
this region. An Australian analyst suggests that a cooperative management
regime is necessary for the common interests of claimant countries. He
believes a management entity for the SCS should be established, comprised
of all surrounding countries, and that ASEAN and China should establish
this organization with the U.S. bringing the experience of ocean management
instead of increased military engagement. This approach is unlikely to work
long-term due to China’s reluctance to submit to international arbitration on
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this issue and seeking to exploit ASEAN member countries internal politics
to its benefit. It is also not likely to work as long as China engages in victim
rhetoric on SCS and other international affairs topics.44
The U.S. should maintain regular discussion with China and candidly
express its concerns about Beijing’s aggressive actions in the SCS. The U.S.
should also increase its cooperation and collaboration with its regional partners to make the costs of Chinese aggression to high. Specific examples of
this would include conducting regular military exercises with partner countries,
providing them with targeted military assets to deter and defeat Chinese
aggressiveness such as A2AD efforts, augmenting Vietnam’s Army, and
augmenting the military and intelligence capabilities of allied SCS nations,
developing financially and strategically realistic doctrine for implementing
JAM-GC, threaten to support Uighur separatists in Western China, and
explicitly and publicly warning China that harassment of U.S. intelligence and
military activities and assets in the SCS will result in the use of lethal force.
U.S. and international policymakers should heed the following words from
Representative Steve Chabot (R-OH) who chaired the House Foreign Affairs
Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on January 14, 2014:
We are witnessing a dangerously aggressive China trying to assert
greater control over these territories to change the regional status
quo in a way that violates the core principles of international law.
The implications of these actions for the United States are substantial
since we have strategic and economic interests that are increasingly
threatened by the growing tension and confrontational incidents in
these waters.
An American presence in Asia is built on maintaining peace
and stability that is upheld through respect for international law,
freedom of navigation, and unhindered, lawful commerce in the
maritime regions. This is pursued through our alliances with Japan,
South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, in addition
to our steadfast relationships with Taiwan and Singapore, and
evolving relationships with Vietnam and Indonesia.45

While much of American public opinion may be way weary, we must
recognize that the persistence of international crisis and potential military
conflict is inexorable. The world should carefully watch China’s response to
pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong as an important indication of
its potential future activities in the SCS. China’s nine-dashed map claims for
the South China Sea may or may not produce international conflict, but the
U.S. and its allies would be wise to prepare domestic public opinion and
militaries for the possibility of such conflict in the years to come. Instead of
being serene in the 21st century, the SCS and significant areas of the Pacific
Ocean, may become the scene of explosive combat and augment what scholar
Colin Gray has described as Another Bloody Century between multiple mili163

tary powers due to this region’s growing economic and strategic importance,
increasing military spending, and competition between powers for access to
and control of its resources by powers as far flung as Australia, China, India,
the United States, and other countries.46
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